In these consolidated appeals, the Court addressed two recurring AMA issues and set aside both Board decisions. First, the appellants argued that fair process and due process categorically require the same Board member who conducts a hearing to also decide the appeal. The Court rejected that categorical argument, holding that neither the Due Process Clause nor fair process requires the same Board member in every case. The Court reasoned that due process is flexible, that Board decisions are made on de novo review of the record, and that the administrative burden of a same-member rule would be substantial. The Court left open only the possibility of an as-applied due process violation on a case-specific record, but found none here.

Second, the Court held that the hearing duties recognized in Bryant continue to apply in AMA Board hearings, even though the regulatory anchor changed from 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) to § 20.705. The Court relied on the nonexclusive language of § 20.705 and VA’s rulemaking commentary stating that the AMA amendments were not intended to limit Bryant. Applying that rule, the Court found that the Board member who conducted Mr. Pinto’s hearing did not fulfill the duty to explain the issues or suggest the submission of potentially advantageous evidence, so Pinto’s PTSD and TDIU appeal was remanded.

Finally, the Court agreed with Mr. Bilharz that the Board’s reasons or bases were inadequate because it dismissed his lay testimony with conclusory statements about competency without clearly addressing credibility or explaining the treatment of favorable evidence. The Court therefore remanded Bilharz’s service-connection claims as well.

In AMA hearings, a Board member who presides at the hearing is not constitutionally required to be the same Board member who later decides the appeal, but the hearing member must still comply with Bryant duties to explain the issues and suggest overlooked advantageous evidence; the Board must also provide adequate reasons or bases when evaluating lay evidence and favorable record evidence.

Advocates should not rely on a blanket objection to Board-member substitution after an AMA hearing, but they should still challenge hearing-conduct deficiencies under Bryant and preserve reasons-or-bases arguments where the Board ignores credibility, competency, or favorable lay testimony.

This is a precedential clarification of AMA hearing practice. It narrows constitutional challenges to substituted decision-makers, preserves the vitality of Bryant in AMA hearings, and reinforces that the Board must meaningfully address lay evidence and explain why it rejects favorable testimony.

Improper Rejection of Lay Evidence [Evidentiary Errors]

A veteran testifies at an AMA Board hearing about missing treatment records and symptom severity, but the presiding member does not explain what evidence would help or suggest that the veteran submit it; another member later denies the claim without discussing the testimony. This case supports remand for a Bryant violation and, separately, for inadequate reasons or bases if lay evidence is dismissed conclusorily.

Use this case to oppose broad due-process attacks on AMA member substitution while arguing that a deficient hearing warrants remand under Bryant. It is also useful for challenging Board decisions that label veteran testimony incompetent without addressing credibility, continuity, or other favorable aspects of the lay evidence.

Bryant v. Shinseki, Frantzis v. McDonough, Thurber v. Brown, Cushman v. Shinseki, Arneson v. Shinseki, Mathews v. Eldridge