The veteran sought service connection for hypertension after prior final denials. The Board reopened the claim but ultimately denied service connection, and the veteran challenged the decision as involving clear and unmistakable error. The Court held that the evidence submitted in support of reopening was not material because it did not establish onset of hypertension in service or within the presumptive period; therefore, reopening was inappropriate. The Court further concluded that the veteran did not show clear and unmistakable error in the earlier Board decision, and any error in the Board’s post-reopening merits review would have been harmless. In concurrence, Judge Kramer stated that VA did not violate the duty to assist and that the record still did not establish hypertension within one year after service.

Evidence is material only if it bears directly and substantially on the matter at issue and changes the factual basis of the prior denial; a CUE allegation fails where the claimant merely disputes the prior weighing or application of the presumptive-service-connection analysis.

Advocates should separate reopening arguments from CUE arguments. Corpuz is a reminder that stale medical evidence or a later diagnosis will not reopen a claim unless it actually alters the service-onset analysis, and that CUE requires a true legal or factual error in the prior final decision.

Corpuz is useful for challenging overbroad reopening determinations and for explaining why a final denial cannot be attacked by repackaging a disagreement as CUE. It also provides a concrete example of the materiality standard in the reopening context and the limits of collateral review.

Treating evidence as material when it does not reasonably change the basis of a prior final denial.

A veteran submits a decades-old treatment note showing a diagnosis long after service and argues it should reopen a final denial for a chronic disease. Corpuz supports denying reopening if the evidence does not tend to prove in-service onset or manifestation within the presumptive period.

Use Corpuz to argue against reopening when the new submission is cumulative or only shows post-service treatment, and to oppose CUE theories that merely contest how the Board evaluated the evidence.

Colvin v. Derwinski, Akins v. Derwinski, Manio v. Derwinski, Russell v. Principi, Gilbert v. Derwinski, Kehoskie v. Derwinski, Thompson v. Derwinski