John L. Dunson appealed a Board decision that denied an effective date earlier than November 2, 1989, for service connection for PTSD and frostbite residuals. He argued that he had sought VA assistance in 1969 and, in his substantive appeal, suggested that if POW status was not recognized until 1981 he should receive at least an effective date tied to that liberalizing change. The Court rejected the idea that the 1969 VAMC interaction constituted an informal claim because the record did not identify the benefit sought, and the duty to assist was not triggered without a well-grounded claim. But the Court held that the Board failed to address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran was entitled to retroactive benefits under the Former Prisoner of War Benefits Act and 38 C.F.R. § 3.114. Because the Board did not discuss that theory or provide adequate reasons or bases, the Court vacated and remanded for readjudication.

The Board must address all issues reasonably raised by a liberal reading of the substantive appeal, including potential entitlement to an earlier effective date under a liberalizing law such as 38 C.F.R. § 3.114.

A veteran’s appeal can preserve an earlier-effective-date theory even when it is not framed perfectly, so long as the substance of the filing reasonably raises it. Counsel should identify liberalizing-law retroactivity whenever service connection or eligibility changed by statute or regulation.

Dunson is an important reasons-or-bases and effective-date case because it requires the Board to consider a benefit theory implied by the veteran’s statements, not just the theory explicitly labeled. It also shows that VA treatment-center interactions do not automatically create informal claims absent identification of the benefit sought.

Failing to address a reasonably raised liberalizing-law effective-date theory in the substantive appeal.

A veteran appeals an effective date for a POW-related award and states in passing that benefits should date back to the enactment of a later POW statute. The Board decides only whether there was an earlier formal claim and ignores the liberalizing-law retroactivity question. Under Dunson, that omission requires remand.

Use this case to argue for remand when the Board ignores a theory of entitlement reasonably raised by the record, especially where a later statutory or regulatory change may support retroactive benefits. It is also useful to distinguish informal claims from internal VA medical-center paperwork.

Myers v. Derwinski, EF v. Derwinski, Mingo v. Derwinski, Gilbert v. Derwinski, Quarles v. Derwinski