This consolidated decision addressed three attorney-fee disputes arising under the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act and 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d). The Court first explained the statutory framework governing fee agreements after a final BVA decision, including the conditions for direct payment of contingent fees from past-due benefits and the Court’s authority under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) and § 7263 to review and enforce such agreements.

As to attorney Smith, the Court held that the agreement did not satisfy § 5904(d) because it combined a $1,000 fixed fee with a 20% contingent fee, exceeding the statutory 20% ceiling. The Court therefore concluded the Secretary had no duty to withhold and pay the fee directly, and there was no basis for sanctions. The Court also noted that, in any event, the client had already paid counsel, eliminating any cognizable enforcement injury.

As to attorney Cox, the Court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the fee agreement because Cox had not represented an appellant before the Court and the Board had not reviewed the agreement. The Court further held that mandamus was unavailable because an alternative remedy existed: Board review under the applicable regulation.

As to attorney Wick, the Court held the agreement complied with § 5904(d) because the fixed-fee provision functioned as a reduction against, not an addition to, the contingent fee, leaving the net fee at 20% of past-due benefits. The Court ordered the Secretary to pay Wick directly. More broadly, the opinion makes clear that the Secretary has a statutory duty—not discretion—to honor qualifying fee agreements, and that the Court may compel compliance without violating sovereign-immunity principles.

A fee agreement that satisfies 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d) entitles the attorney to direct payment from past-due benefits, and the Court may compel the Secretary to honor that statutory duty; agreements exceeding the statutory limits do not qualify.

Advocates must draft VA fee agreements to fit squarely within § 5904(d) if they want direct payment from past-due benefits. The case also underscores that jurisdiction depends on whether the Board or the Court has authority over the fee agreement, and that an already-paid attorney may lack an enforcement remedy.

This is an early, important interpretation of the VJRA attorney-fee scheme. It clarifies the Court’s enforcement power, the Secretary’s mandatory duty to comply with qualifying agreements, and the practical consequences of drafting a fee contract that does or does not stay within the 20% statutory framework.

Drafting or enforcing a fee agreement that exceeds the statutory 20% limit or otherwise fails to qualify under § 5904(d).

An attorney represents a veteran after a final BVA decision under a contingent-fee contract calling for 20% of any past-due benefits, but VA pays the full retroactive award to the veteran instead of withholding the fee. If the agreement otherwise satisfies § 5904(d), the attorney may seek Court enforcement of the statutory payment duty.

Use this case to argue that VA must honor qualifying direct-payment fee agreements and that the Court can compel compliance where jurisdiction exists. It is also useful for distinguishing nonqualifying contracts and for challenging attempts to recast statutory fee enforcement as a sovereign-immunity problem.

Bowen v. Galbreath, Celebrezze v. Sparks, Aronson v. Derwinski, Matter of Smith