The veteran, whose dishonorable discharge was later upgraded to a bad-conduct discharge, sought VA benefits by arguing that a seizure disorder caused blackouts and violent outbursts amounting to insanity under 38 U.S.C. § 5303(b). After an earlier administrative denial based on the character of discharge, he submitted service records, private medical letters, SSA records, and treatment notes in an effort to reopen the claim. The Board reopened the claim but denied it on the merits. On appeal, the Court held that the claim should not have been reopened because the evidence was not new and material under Colvin v. Derwinski. Most of the service records were cumulative, and the new material did not address the critical issue—whether he was insane at the time of the offenses leading to court-martial and discharge. Because none of the medical evidence opined on insanity at the relevant time, reopening was improper. The Court treated the Board’s decision to reopen as harmless error and affirmed.

Evidence is material only if it is relevant and probative of the dispositive issue and creates a reasonable possibility of a changed outcome; evidence that does not address the statutory insanity exception to a discharge bar is not material for reopening.

When the threshold issue is a discharge bar, advocates must submit evidence tied to the specific statutory exception, not just evidence of diagnosis or long-standing symptoms. Reopening fails if the new evidence does not speak to the legally controlling fact.

This decision shows how narrowly materiality is measured in reopening cases. It is especially important where the claimant is trying to overcome a character-of-discharge bar, because general psychiatric or neurological evidence will not reopen the claim unless it bears on insanity at the time of the offense.

Relying on evidence that does not address the dispositive legal element needed to reopen the claim.

A veteran with a bad-conduct discharge submits new records showing a long history of mental health treatment, but none of the records discuss whether he was insane when the offenses leading to discharge occurred. Under this case, VA may reject reopening because the evidence is not material to the discharge-bar exception.

Use this case when arguing that reopening failed because the claimant’s new submissions were cumulative or missed the controlling issue. It is also useful when defending a denial against an argument that any new diagnosis automatically qualifies as material evidence.

Colvin v. Derwinski, Manio v. Derwinski, Kehoskie v. Derwinski