The appellant sought service connection for PTSD based on several alleged Vietnam stressors, but the evidentiary record contained conflicting psychiatric diagnoses and incomplete corroboration of the claimed events. The Board denied the claim, reasoning that the symptoms did not establish PTSD and expressing skepticism about the existence of an adequate stressor. On appeal, the Court held that the factual record had been inadequately developed and therefore could not support affirmance or reversal on the merits.

The Court explained that the psychiatric evidence did not comply with 38 C.F.R. § 4.126 because the diagnoses did not adequately distinguish PTSD from other psychiatric conditions such as personality disorder and substance abuse. The Court also held that the Board appeared to have substituted its own medical judgment for independent medical evidence, contrary to Colvin. In addition, the Board failed to make a sufficiently supported finding on whether the claimed stressors were adequately demonstrated and credible, which prevented meaningful judicial review under Gilbert. The Court further rejected the Board’s apparent reliance on the lateness of the PTSD claim, noting that delayed onset is consistent with PTSD by definition.

The Court vacated the Board decision and remanded for further development, including a compliant psychological examination and proper readjudication. The case is important because it underscores that PTSD claims require careful factual development, explicit stressor findings, and competent medical evidence separating service-connected PTSD from other psychiatric pathology before denial is appropriate.

Where a PTSD claim is not adequately developed and the medical evidence is conflicting or incomplete, the Board must obtain proper medical evaluation, base its findings on independent medical evidence, and provide explicit stressor findings supported by adequate reasons or bases.

Mee is a strong remand authority for challenging PTSD denials built on incomplete development, unsupported Board medical inference, or vague stressor analysis.

It provides clear appellate support for insisting on a proper PTSD examination and for attacking Board decisions that deny PTSD without resolving conflicting diagnoses or making explicit findings on the alleged stressors. Practitioners can use it to argue that the Board must develop the record before rejecting PTSD and cannot rely on its own interpretation of psychiatric evidence.

Inadequate VA Examination

A veteran submits multiple PTSD diagnoses, but the Board denies the claim by saying the symptoms are really due to personality disorder or substance abuse without obtaining a clarifying examination or explaining which stressors it finds credible. Mee supports remand for proper development and reasons or bases.

Use this case to argue for remand when the Board denies PTSD based on incomplete psychiatric development, fails to make explicit stressor findings, or appears to substitute its own medical judgment for competent medical evidence.

Colvin v. Derwinski, Gilbert v. Derwinski, Bowers v. Derwinski, Hatlestad v. Derwinski, Paller v. Principi