This case arose from an EAJA application following Mr. Stinson’s successful appeal in a service-connection case involving BPDCN. The underlying merits litigation ended with the Federal Circuit remanding for further factual development after concluding that the location of the veteran’s in-service rash and later lesion was open to debate and that the Board and medical evidence had not addressed a theory reasonably raised by the record. In this EAJA decision, the Court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the Federal Circuit’s remand was purely jurisdictional or discretionary and held that the appellate reasoning implicitly identified Board error by faulting the Board for not discussing potentially favorable service treatment records. That made Mr. Stinson a prevailing party under EAJA because the remand materially altered the legal relationship between the parties and required further agency proceedings.

The Court then turned to substantial justification and fee reasonableness. It concluded that the Secretary’s position was not substantially justified because the Board failed to address favorable evidence the law required it to discuss. But the Court also found several billing concerns in the fee petition, including duplication among multiple attorneys, excessive oral-argument preparation, unnecessary work on a failed remand motion, overbilling on tables of authorities, and unclear extension motions. Balancing those concerns, the Court granted the application in part and reduced the requested award by 25%. Judge Toth dissented, reasoning that the Federal Circuit could not have made an implicit finding of administrative error and that EAJA eligibility therefore was not established.

For EAJA purposes, a claimant prevails when the controlling remand decision, read as a whole, implicitly reflects Board error that required further agency proceedings and materially altered the parties’ legal relationship; however, the Court may reduce the fee award for excessive, duplicative, or inadequately supported billing.

EAJA eligibility can turn on whether an appellate remand implicitly identifies Board error, not on whether the appellate court used magic words. Even where entitlement is established, practitioners should expect close scrutiny of staffing, oral-argument preparation, and motion practice in the fee petition.

The case is useful for EAJA practice because it explains how the Court may infer administrative error from the reasoning and mandate of a remand decision, especially where the Board failed to address evidence reasonably raised by the record. It also provides a detailed example of how the Court evaluates fee reasonableness and why an otherwise successful EAJA request can be trimmed significantly.

Failure to Address Favorable Evidence [Evidentiary Errors]

A veteran wins a Federal Circuit remand because the Board failed to discuss service records that reasonably supported the claimed disability, then files an EAJA motion. Counsel cites this case to argue prevailing-party status, while also preparing a conservative, well-documented fee petition to avoid reductions for duplication or excessive staffing.

Use this decision to argue that remand-based EAJA eligibility does not require an explicit statement of Board error if the appellate reasoning necessarily implies it. Also use it to support targeted reductions or defenses against fee petitions that show excessive attorney overlap, unclear time entries, or inflated preparation time.

Stinson v. Collins, Stinson v. McDonough, Robinson v. O’Rourke, Davis v. Nicholson, Former Emps. of Motorola Ceramic Prods. v. United States, Pierce v. Underwood, Stillwell v. Brown