Barfield v. Brown — New and material evidence must be relevant and noncumulative to reopen a claim

Linda L. Barfield sought to reopen a previously denied claim for service connection for the cause of her veteran husband’s death, which had been attributed to sepsis resulting from peritonitis as a consequence of liver disease. The Board had earlier denied the claim and later found that the evidence submitted in support of reopening did not qualify as new and material. On review, the Court affirmed.

The Court explained that under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108, a disallowed claim must be reopened only when new and material evidence is presented. Applying Colvin, the Court stated that material evidence must be relevant and probative of the issue at hand and that new evidence cannot be merely cumulative. Barfield’s submitted 1981 examination record confirmed alcoholism in service, but that fact had already been before the Board and the report did not address liver disease or the cause of death. The Court therefore held that the evidence was not material.

The Court also rejected Barfield’s personal belief that alcoholism caused her husband’s death, noting that as a lay witness she was not competent to render a medical causation opinion. The Court affirmed the Board’s refusal to reopen without reaching any broader question about whether chronic alcoholism itself could be service connected.

Evidence is new and material only if it is not cumulative and is relevant and probative of the specific issue that was the basis for the prior final denial.

When the prior denial turned on a missing nexus or cause-of-death element, reopening requires evidence that actually addresses that gap—not evidence merely restating an already established diagnosis or lay speculation.

Barfield is a straightforward reopening case that helps define the threshold showing under 38 U.S.C. § 5108. It is useful when arguing that a claimant has submitted only repetitive evidence or lay assertions that do not cure the defect in the prior final denial.

Improperly treating cumulative evidence or lay causation statements as sufficient to reopen a finally denied claim.

A surviving spouse submits a duplicate service treatment record showing an in-service diagnosis already known to VA, while the prior denial was based on lack of nexus to the veteran’s death. Under Barfield, the claim should not be reopened on that submission alone.

Use Barfield to argue that reopening fails where the evidence does not speak to the precise missing element identified in the prior denial, especially when the new submission is duplicative or outside lay competence.

38 U.S.C.A. § 5108, Colvin v. Derwinski, Espiritu v. Derwinski, Gilbert v. Derwinski