Bledsoe v. Derwinski — Child permanently incapable of self-support must be shown before age 18

The appellant, a veteran rated 100 percent disabled, sought additional compensation for his adult son on the theory that the son became permanently incapable of self-support before turning 18. The Court reviewed the governing statute and regulation, which allow additional compensation only when the evidence shows the child was permanently incapable of self-support prior to age 18. The record reflected marginal intellectual limitations, special education, and later employment history, but the Board found that the later bipolar disorder was not present before March 1977, when the son turned 18. Applying the clearly erroneous standard to this factual determination, the Court held the Board’s conclusion was supported by the record and affirmed. The Court also noted that the Board’s isolated use of an employment-based formulation was incorrect, but harmless because the decision repeatedly and correctly used the statutory self-support standard.

For a veteran to receive additional compensation for a child, the evidence must show that the child became permanently incapable of self-support before age 18; later disability does not establish entitlement absent a showing of pre-18 permanent incapacity.

The controlling inquiry is child self-support before age 18, not adult unemployability. A single misstatement of the standard will not necessarily warrant remand if the Board’s reasoning otherwise clearly applies the correct rule.

Bledsoe is useful in dependency and child-benefit disputes because it distinguishes the veteran disability framework from the child self-support standard and reinforces that the Board’s decision will be upheld when the correct legal test is clear from the whole opinion. It also provides a practical harmless-error example for defending Board decisions against isolated drafting mistakes.

Using the veteran unemployability standard instead of the child permanent self-support standard.

A veteran seeks additional compensation for an adult child with longstanding developmental limitations. VA must decide whether the child was permanently incapable of self-support before age 18, and later-acquired psychiatric disability alone is not enough.

Use this case to argue that the relevant entitlement inquiry is confined to the child’s condition before age 18 and that post-18 deterioration cannot substitute for the required historical showing. It can also be cited to defend a Board decision where the correct standard is apparent from the opinion as a whole despite a stray incorrect phrase.