Breslow v. Brown — Final judgment based on then-valid jurisdictional rule was not void after later change in law

The Court addressed the Secretary’s post-judgment motion to vacate a prior remand in Breslow’s appeal after later cases, especially Hamilton v. Brown, changed the governing rule on notices of disagreement. Under Whitt v. Derwinski, which controlled when the Court originally decided the case, the veteran’s November 25, 1988 notice of disagreement on the increased-rating issue conferred jurisdiction. The Secretary later argued that Hamilton’s single-NOD rule meant the Court lacked jurisdiction all along, making the earlier judgment void ab initio.

The Court rejected that position. It explained that a court may determine its own jurisdiction, and an error in interpreting a jurisdictional statute does not necessarily create a void judgment. The Court distinguished a truly void judgment, entered with a total want of subject matter jurisdiction, from a voidable or merely erroneous judgment entered under an interpretation of law that was later changed. Because the judgment in Breslow was final and entered under the then-governing Whitt rule, the Court held that it could not be collaterally attacked as void. The motion to recall or vacate was denied, and the earlier judgment remained in effect.

A final judgment entered under a then-controlling jurisdictional interpretation is not void merely because later precedent narrows that jurisdictional rule; absent a total want of jurisdiction, the judgment is final and not subject to collateral attack.

Later changes in NOD jurisdiction doctrine do not automatically reopen final Court judgments. The decision underscores the importance of finality and the narrowness of void-judgment arguments in veterans appeals.

Breslow helps preserve finality where the Court acted consistently with the law as it existed at the time. It is useful when opposing attempts to undo final appellate outcomes based on later jurisdictional precedent, especially in disputes involving NOD timing and recall of mandate.

Attempting to collaterally attack a final judgment as void based on a later change in jurisdictional precedent.

A veteran wins a remand from the Court under the jurisdictional rule then in effect, but the Secretary later seeks to vacate after a new case changes the NOD standard. Breslow supports denying that request if the original judgment was not entered in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

Cite this case to defend final judgments against post hoc voidness arguments, especially where the Court previously relied on controlling precedent that was later overruled.

Whitt v. Derwinski, Hamilton v. Brown, Strott v. Derwinski, Hooks v. Hooks