Stone v. Nicholson — § 1154(b) does not relax proof of combat status

Donald W. Stone appealed the Veterans Court’s affirmance of the Board’s denial of service connection for PTSD. The Federal Circuit reviewed only issues of statutory and regulatory interpretation, not the underlying factual finding that Stone did not establish combat status. The court held that 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) does not provide a relaxed standard for proving that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy; rather, the statute applies only once combat status is established. Because Stone had not shown he was a combat veteran, the Veterans Court correctly concluded that § 1154(b) did not govern his proof of service incurrence. The court also rejected Stone’s challenge to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), explaining that the Board had considered his lay statements but permissibly found no credible corroboration of the alleged stressors. The decision reinforces that combat status and stressor corroboration are distinct issues, and that lay statements alone do not automatically establish a PTSD stressor absent the conditions required by the regulation.

Section 1154(b) applies only after combat status is established; it does not relax the evidentiary standard for proving that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy.

Before invoking the combat presumption, a claimant must first establish combat status. For PTSD claims, Stone also underscores that the Board may consider lay evidence but still require credible corroboration when the regulatory criteria demand it.

Stone is a key Federal Circuit limitation on § 1154(b). It prevents advocates from assuming that service in Vietnam or another combat theater automatically triggers the combat presumption, and it separates the threshold combat-status inquiry from the later service-incurrence inquiry. The case is also useful when evaluating whether the Board properly treated a veteran’s own statements as corroboration of a claimed stressor.

Improper Application of Anti-Pyramiding [Rating Error]

A Vietnam veteran reports PTSD based on firefights but lacks independent evidence showing combat participation. Stone is cited to argue that § 1154(b) cannot be used until combat status is first established by competent evidence, and that the Board may require corroboration of stressors under the applicable PTSD regulation.

Use Stone to frame § 1154(b) as a two-step issue: first prove combat status, then invoke the relaxed proof rule for in-service incurrence. It is also useful to defend a Board finding that a veteran’s own statements do not, by themselves, corroborate a non-combat PTSD stressor.

Collette v. Brown, Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs