Winters v. Wilkie — EAJA prevailing-party status requires remand predicated on agency error

Regina Winters, the surviving spouse of a deceased veteran, pursued substituted and accrued-benefits claims after the Board issued separate decisions in 2013 and 2014. The Veterans Court later dismissed the appeal of the 2013 Board decision for lack of jurisdiction because that decision was not final under Ratliff, and it vacated and remanded the 2014 Board decision because the issues were inextricably intertwined and further proceedings were needed. Winters then sought attorney fees under EAJA for the Veterans Court litigation.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of EAJA fees. It explained that EAJA prevailing-party status in the administrative-remand context generally requires a remand predicated on agency error when the court does not retain jurisdiction. The court rejected Winters’s argument that the Board’s lack of Ratliff notice, or the Veterans Court’s description of the 2014 decision as “premature,” amounted to a finding of administrative error. The remand was instead driven by judicial economy and the intertwined posture of the claims, which does not materially alter the parties’ legal relationship for EAJA purposes. The court also held that CRST did not change the need for such a material alteration and that Winters therefore failed to carry her burden of proving prevailing-party status.

For EAJA purposes, a claimant is not a prevailing party when the Veterans Court remands a Board decision solely for judicial economy or because claims are inextricably intertwined, unless the remand is grounded in administrative error or clearly materializes a judicially sanctioned alteration of the parties’ legal relationship.

A remand alone is not enough for EAJA fees. Advocates must be able to tie the remand to VA or Board error, not just to timing, jurisdiction, or efficiency concerns.

This decision is important for fee litigation after remands from the Veterans Court. It draws a sharp line between remands based on alleged agency error and remands entered for docket-management or intertwined-claims reasons, limiting EAJA recovery where the court does not actually adjudicate an agency mistake.

Assuming any remand from the Veterans Court automatically establishes EAJA prevailing-party status.

A veteran wins a remand because related claims are intertwined and the court wants the Board to consider them together, but the order does not identify any VA error. Under Winters, that claimant likely cannot recover EAJA fees on the theory that the remand itself made them a prevailing party.

Use this case to oppose EAJA fee requests where the remand was based on judicial economy, finality, or intertwined issues rather than a merits-based finding of agency error. It is also useful when arguing that a court’s use of terms like “premature” or a jurisdictional concession does not equal an EAJA-qualifying error finding.

CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., Robinson v. O’Rourke, Motorola Ceramic Prods. v. United States, Davis v. Nicholson, Gurley v. Peake, Eady v. Shinseki, Henderson v. West, Tyrues v. Shinseki, Akers v. Nicholson