Wood v. Peake — VA must apply 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a) to DIC medical-opinion requests

The widow of a veteran sought dependency and indemnity compensation based on her contention that her husband’s death was materially related to an in-service head injury and resulting chronic headaches. The Board denied her request for a medical opinion, and the Veterans Court affirmed after analyzing the request under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d), the provision governing examinations for disability-compensation claims. The Federal Circuit held that this was legal error because DIC claims are governed by the general duty-to-assist provision in § 5103A(a).

The court explained that § 5103A(a) requires reasonable efforts to obtain evidence necessary to substantiate a claim unless no reasonable possibility exists that assistance would help. It rejected the government’s harmless-error argument because the record contained conflicting medical evidence, including an autopsy report suggesting headaches contributed to death and a death certificate that omitted them. Determining whether the error was harmless would require weighing evidence and applying the correct legal standard to disputed facts, which is beyond the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292. The court therefore vacated and remanded for the Veterans Court to apply § 5103A(a) in the first instance.

For DIC claims, VA’s duty to assist a claimant in obtaining a medical opinion is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a), and a court may not affirm a contrary ruling on harmless-error grounds when doing so would require resolution of disputed facts.

When the claim is for DIC, advocates should challenge any Board or Veterans Court analysis that uses the disability-compensation examination standard of § 5103A(d) instead of the broader § 5103A(a) standard.

Wood is an important duty-to-assist decision because it clarifies that DIC claimants are not limited to the § 5103A(d) examination framework. It also reinforces the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional limits: if the harmless-error question turns on disputed medical evidence, the court must remand rather than reweigh the record.

Applying the disability-compensation examination standard of § 5103A(d) to a DIC claim instead of the general duty-to-assist standard in § 5103A(a).

A surviving spouse submits an autopsy report and other medical evidence suggesting a service-related condition contributed to death, but the Board denies a requested medical opinion by relying on the § 5103A(d) examination criteria. Under Wood, that is the wrong statutory framework.

Use Wood to argue that DIC claims require analysis under § 5103A(a), particularly where a medical opinion could help resolve conflicting evidence about cause of death. It is also useful for opposing harmless-error arguments when the agency’s error cannot be evaluated without weighing disputed medical evidence.

DeLaRosa v. Peake, D’Amico v. West, Szemraj v. Principi, Bailey v. Principi