The Court held that a claim for an increased rating remains in controversy when less than the maximum available benefit is awarded, so a later RO award of 30% did not extinguish the pending appeal from a prior NOD seeking a higher rating. The decision is a key jurisdiction and rating appeal case because VA must generally treat a claimant as seeking the maximum schedular benefit unless the claimant clearly limits the appeal.

The veteran appealed a Board decision denying a rating higher than 30 percent for PTSD. The Court first addressed jurisdiction because the claim arose from an NOD filed before November 18, 1988, which could not itself confer Court jurisdiction under the VJRA. Applying Hamilton v. Derwinski and related jurisdictional principles, the Court concluded that the veteran’s February 1988 NOD placed in issue entitlement to a rating higher than 10 percent, and that the RO’s later award of 30 percent did not fully satisfy the appeal because VA’s rating schedule allowed higher ratings and the veteran had not clearly limited the appeal to 30 percent. The Court explained that, absent a clear statement limiting the issue, a claimant seeking an increased rating is presumed to seek the maximum benefit available. Because the pre-VJRA NOD remained pending and could not be supplemented by a new jurisdiction-conferring NOD after November 18, 1988, the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The case is especially important for the rule that a partial grant does not end an increased-rating appeal unless the claimant clearly indicates satisfaction with the awarded level or otherwise withdraws the appeal.

The Court held that VA must provide a dermatology examination during an active stage of a fluctuating skin condition when the disability’s severity varies by flare-up and remission. The Board also had to provide adequate reasons or bases for its extraschedular-referral analysis.

The veteran sought an increased rating for service-connected tinea pedis, a skin condition that repeatedly flared and then improved. The Court reviewed a record showing that the disability had active and inactive stages and that prior medical evidence documented recurring outbreaks, lesions, maceration, and an id reaction affecting other body parts. The Board denied an increase based on a September 1991 VA examination, but the Court found that examination inadequate because it was performed during an inactive stage of the condition. Citing the duty to assist and the need for a fully informed evaluation, the Court held that VA had to provide an examination during an active stage so the disability could be assessed accurately under the rating schedule. The Court also held that the Board’s extraschedular discussion was conclusory and lacked adequate reasons or bases for declining referral under 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1). Because the record was inadequate for judicial review but did not compel reversal, the Court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for readjudication.

The Court affirmed one rating determination but vacated and remanded others because the Board failed to provide adequate reasons or bases for rejecting lay testimony supporting sinusitis and concussion ratings, and failed to address a reasonably raised service-connection claim for a psychological disorder.

Jimmy F. Ashmore sought increased ratings for service-connected facial asymmetry, maxillary sinusitis, and residuals of a cerebral concussion, and also asserted that he had a psychiatric disorder secondary to his in-service head injury. The Court affirmed the Board’s denial of an increased rating for facial disfigurement because the Board relied on medical findings describing the deformity as mild, and that factual determination was not clearly erroneous.

The Court vacated and remanded the denials involving maxillary sinusitis and cerebral concussion because the Board failed to make explicit credibility findings regarding Ashmore’s sworn testimony describing headaches, drainage, dizziness, and insomnia. The Court explained that when such testimony could support entitlement under the applicable diagnostic codes, the Board must address credibility and provide adequate reasons or bases for rejecting it. The Court also held that the Board erred by failing to address Ashmore’s expressly raised claim for service connection for a psychological disorder, which the record reasonably presented and which the Board overlooked altogether. The decision underscores both the Board’s reasons-or-bases obligations and its duty to address issues plainly raised by the claimant and the record.

The Court vacated and remanded because the record did not adequately develop how the veteran’s PTSD affected ordinary employment and employability, leaving no sufficient basis to decide the rating or TDIU claim.

The veteran appealed a Board decision that granted a 50% PTSD rating but denied a higher rating and a total disability rating based on individual unemployability. The Court held that the evidentiary record was inadequately developed. The VA examination addressed reality testing, judgment, and insight, while the private psychologist’s records focused heavily on the veteran’s inability to handle a particularly stressful county job. The Court explained that neither source adequately addressed the central regulatory question: the extent to which PTSD limited the veteran’s ability to function under ordinary employment conditions. Because the record did not sufficiently address employability and industrial impairment, the Court vacated the Board decision and remanded for further development. The Court also treated the TDIU issue as inextricably intertwined with the rating issue and directed the Board to address it on readjudication.

The Court held that the Board may deny referral for extraschedular consideration under 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1) in the first instance without automatically violating due process, provided the claimant is not prejudiced. However, the Board erred by failing to provide adequate reasons and bases for concluding that the veteran’s disability did not markedly interfere with employment despite favorable evidence from a prospective employer.

The veteran sought a higher rating and extraschedular compensation after blindness in his left eye resulted from VA cataract surgery compensated under 38 U.S.C. § 1151. The Board denied both an increased schedular rating and extraschedular consideration under 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1), concluding that the disability did not produce marked interference with employment or frequent hospitalization.

The Court addressed the procedural question left open after Floyd v. Brown regarding whether the Board could deny extraschedular referral in the first instance. The Court clarified that while the Board may not assign an extraschedular rating initially, it may determine whether referral to VA officials with delegated authority is warranted. The Court also held that deciding the referral question at the Board level did not prejudice the veteran under the facts presented because the veteran had fully argued the issue before the RO and Board.

However, the Court found the Board’s statement of reasons and bases inadequate. The Board failed to meaningfully discuss favorable evidence, including a letter from a prospective employer stating the veteran was denied employment due to his physical disabilities. Because the Board provided only conclusory analysis regarding marked interference with employment, remand was required.

The Court also determined that the increased-rating issue was inextricably intertwined with the pending TDIU and extraschedular issues because a favorable determination on either could affect the ultimate disability evaluation.

The Court held that the presence of suicidal ideation alone may support a 70% mental-health rating under 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 and that VA may not require evidence of suicidal intent, hospitalization, or active planning before recognizing suicidal ideation as occupational and social impairment contemplated by the rating criteria. The Court further held that the Board erred by improperly minimizing the severity of suicidal ideation and misapplying the mental-health rating framework.

Bankhead v. Shulkin is one of the most important modern mental-health rating cases interpreting VA’s General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders under 38 C.F.R. § 4.130.

The veteran sought a rating higher than 50% for service-connected PTSD. The record documented:

• chronic suicidal ideation,
• severe depression,
• anger,
• social isolation,
• impaired impulse control,
• occupational impairment,
• and serious interpersonal difficulties.

Despite repeated evidence of suicidal thoughts, the Board denied a 70% rating, reasoning that:

• the veteran had not been hospitalized,
• denied intent to act,
• maintained some social relationships,
• and generally remained oriented and functional.

The Court reversed the Board’s interpretation of the rating criteria.

The Court closely analyzed the structure of:

• the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders,
• the symptom examples listed in § 4.130,
• and VA’s obligation to conduct a holistic analysis of occupational and social impairment.

The Court emphasized that:

• suicidal ideation appears only in the 70% rating criteria,
• and the regulation contains no requirement for:
• suicidal plan,
• hospitalization,
• preparatory behavior,
• active intent,
• or inpatient treatment.

The Court rejected the Board’s attempt to impose additional severity requirements not found in the regulation.

Importantly, the Court clarified that:

• both passive and active suicidal ideation are contemplated by the 70% criteria,
• and suicidal ideation alone may cause occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas.

The Court also criticized the Board for:

• selectively focusing on evidence suggesting functioning,
• minimizing the significance of suicidal ideation,
• and improperly requiring symptom matching rather than evaluating overall impairment.

The Court reaffirmed that:

• mental-health ratings are not determined through mechanical checklist analysis,
• and the ultimate inquiry concerns the level of occupational and social impairment caused by symptoms.

The Court vacated and remanded because the Board failed to properly apply § 4.130 and failed to adequately explain why suicidal ideation did not support a higher rating.

Bankhead became one of the most heavily cited PTSD and mental-health rating cases in modern veterans law.

The Court held that the veteran was entitled to a 10% lumbosacral strain rating from the date of service connection because the record already showed characteristic pain on motion. It also vacated and remanded the higher-rating issue because the Board failed to adequately discuss the effect of extreme and consistent pain under §§ 4.40 and 4.45.

In this appeal from a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision, the Court addressed two issues involving the veteran’s lumbosacral strain: whether a 10% rating should be effective from the date of service connection, and whether the veteran was entitled to more than a 20% rating. The Court concluded that the Board clearly erred in denying an earlier effective date for the 10% rating because the record already documented pain on motion at the time service connection began, satisfying Diagnostic Code 5295’s criteria for a compensable evaluation. The Court therefore ordered the Board to assign the 10% rating effective the date of service connection.

The Court also granted the Secretary’s request for a partial remand on the increased-rating issue because the Board had not adequately discussed the veteran’s allegations of extreme and consistent pain. Relying on 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40 and 4.45, as well as Schafrath and Gilbert, the Court held that the Board’s reasons were insufficient for failing to address the functional impact of pain on the disability rating. The case is useful for practitioners seeking an earlier effective date for an initial musculoskeletal rating and for arguing that the Board must meaningfully analyze functional loss due to pain.

The Court held that 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.123, 4.124, and 4.124a do not categorically bar separate ratings for paralysis, neuritis, and neuralgia of the same peripheral nerve. Because the record reasonably raised separate neuritis and neuralgia theories, the Board had to address them, and the case was remanded.

Jacob Banschbach appealed a Board decision addressing ratings for residuals of an in-service hernia repair, including nerve injury involving the ilio-inguinal and anterior crural nerves. The principal dispute was whether the rating schedule and anti-pyramiding principles barred separate evaluations for paralysis, neuritis, and neuralgia of the same peripheral nerve. The Secretary argued that neuritis and neuralgia are subsumed within a paralysis rating; the veteran argued that the regulations permit separate ratings when the manifestations are distinct.

The Court interpreted 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.123, 4.124, and 4.124a and concluded that those provisions do not prohibit separate consideration of neuritis and neuralgia merely because a paralysis rating already exists. The Court reasoned that the regulations use different diagnostic codes and different symptom descriptions for paralysis, neuritis, and neuralgia, and that reading them as a categorical bar would render the neuritis and neuralgia codes superfluous. The Court also emphasized that the anti-pyramiding inquiry is factual and depends on whether the symptomatology actually overlaps in a particular case.

The Court then held that the issue was reasonably raised by the record, citing treatment notes and examination findings referencing pain, neuritis, and neuralgia. Because the Board did not address whether separate ratings were warranted under DCs 8630 and 8730, the Court vacated the relevant portion of the Board decision and remanded for further adjudication. The opinion is useful for advocates seeking separate peripheral nerve ratings and for arguing that the Board must analyze reasonably raised rating theories rather than assume they are foreclosed by a current diagnostic code assignment.

The Court vacated and remanded the Board’s denial of an increased rating for anxiety disorder because the Board failed to provide adequate reasons or bases, did not discuss potentially relevant rating criteria, improperly relied on a nonexistent requirement of chronic worsening, and inadequately explained its benefit-of-the-doubt analysis.

Ronnie Lee Barnes sought an increased rating for his service-connected anxiety disorder, which was then rated 30 percent disabling. After a VA examination and an adverse regional office decision, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the denial. On appeal, the Court granted the Secretary’s motion for remand and held that the Board’s decision contained multiple legal errors. The Court explained that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons or bases for its credibility and probative-value determinations regarding the hearing testimony and medical examinations, failed to discuss rating criteria potentially relevant to the headache component of the disability, and improperly relied in part on a requirement that the increase be “chronic,” which the Secretary conceded was not legally required. The Court also found the Board’s explanation of why the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine did not apply to be inadequate. The decision was vacated and remanded for reconsideration and any further examination deemed warranted because of the passage of time.

The Court affirmed most of the Board’s denials but reversed the PTSD rating decision, holding that the record compelled at least a 70% evaluation under Diagnostic Code 9411. The case matters because it demonstrates that a rating finding may be clearly erroneous when the evidence of severity leaves no plausible basis for the Board’s lower evaluation.

Barnhill appealed multiple Board denials, but the Court found only the PTSD rating issue warranted discussion. The veteran had a long procedural history involving earlier claims for anxiety/PTSD, multiple examinations, and eventually a grant of service connection for PTSD with a 30 percent rating. On appeal, the Court reviewed the Board’s denial of an increased PTSD evaluation under the clearly erroneous standard and concluded there was no plausible basis for denying a higher rating. The Court relied on evidence describing severe PTSD with profound social and industrial impairment and the opinion of a private psychiatrist indicating significant occupational difficulty. It held the record compelled at least a 70 percent evaluation under Diagnostic Code 9411, reversed the Board on that issue, and remanded for assignment of the proper rating. The Court affirmed the other denied claims and also affirmed the Board’s denial of an earlier effective date for PTSD.

The Federal Circuit held that 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1) does not bar the Director of Compensation Service from considering an agency recommendation before deciding an extra-schedular rating request. The court relied on the plain text of the regulation and its prior decision in Thun to conclude that the Director retained independent authority.

Joseph A. Bell appealed the Veterans Court’s affirmance of a Board decision denying an extra-schedular rating for a lumbar spine disability. The relevant issue on appeal was whether the Director of Compensation Service acted unlawfully by considering a regional office recommendation that the extra-schedular rating be denied before issuing the Director’s advisory opinion. The Federal Circuit held that the governing regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1), does not prohibit the Director from considering such a recommendation. The court emphasized the plain language of the regulation, which authorizes the Director to approve an extra-schedular evaluation, and explained that its prior decision in Thun v. Shinseki recognized the agency’s practice of field station submissions and the Director’s ultimate discretionary authority. Because Bell did not show that the Director failed to exercise independent judgment, the court affirmed.

The Court held that personality disorders are developmental defects not subject to service connection and affirmed the Board’s denial of a higher anxiety rating because the Board’s finding of only mild impairment was plausible under the evidence.

The appellant sought service connection for a personality disorder and an increased rating for service-connected anxiety reaction. The Board denied both, finding that a personality disorder is a developmental defect rather than an acquired psychiatric disease and that the anxiety reaction produced no more than mild social and industrial impairment. The Court affirmed.

On the service-connection issue, the Court agreed that personality disorders are not disabilities for VA compensation purposes under the governing regulations. On the rating issue, the Court reviewed the Board’s factual determination under the clearly erroneous standard and concluded that the record plausibly supported the finding that the service-connected anxiety reaction was only mildly disabling. The Court also noted that any unemployability theory based on the service-connected condition would not be supported on this record and that a pension theory was not before the Board. The decision is a straightforward application of the noncompensability of personality disorders and appellate deference to supported Board factfinding.

The Court held that VA committed clear and unmistakable error by assigning a 40% rating for traumatic arteriovenous aneurysm with cardiac involvement when Diagnostic Code 7113 required at least 60%. It also held that the subsequent April 1960 reduction could not be valid because VA did not provide the notice and opportunity to respond required for rating reductions.

The veteran sought revision of 1960 rating decisions that assigned a 40 percent evaluation for traumatic arteriovenous aneurysm with cardiac involvement. The Court reviewed the rating schedule then in effect and concluded that Diagnostic Code 7113 required a minimum 60 percent rating for an aneurysm with cardiac involvement. Because the February 24, 1960 rating assigned only 40 percent despite that schedular requirement, the Court held that the decision was clearly and unmistakably erroneous as a matter of law. The Court further held that, once the proper 60 percent rating should have been in place, VA could not lawfully reduce the evaluation to 40 percent in April 1960 without providing written notice of the reduction and an opportunity to respond, as required by the regulation then in effect. The Court reversed and remanded with instructions to award the 60 percent rating effective February 24, 1960 and vacate the April 1960 reduction. The Court also noted that a coronary artery disease issue mentioned by the Board had not been properly developed or placed before the Board and therefore was not decided on the merits.

The Court remanded because the record did not include an adequate examination of the veteran’s herpes disability during an active outbreak, making the rating evidence incomplete. The decision emphasizes that episodic conditions must be evaluated by their frequency, duration, and severity during flare-ups, and that VA should also address a reasonably raised TDIU claim on remand.

The appellant sought a higher rating for service-connected residuals of herpes virus infection. The Court observed that the Board had relied on the fact that the lesions went into remission, but the record did not contain an examination conducted during the active stage of the disease. The Court explained that for conditions evaluated by appearance, disfigurement, and functional limitation, the key evidence is the severity, frequency, and duration of outbreaks during flare-ups, not simply the fact that symptoms are intermittent. Because the record was inadequately developed, the Court remanded for further factual development, including attempts to obtain photographs and an examination during an active phase. The Court also rejected a newly asserted psychiatric residual theory as not well grounded on the existing record and instructed the Board to address the reasonably raised unemployability issue on remand.

A TDIU award based on a single service-connected disability may satisfy the “rated as total” requirement under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s), potentially establishing entitlement to SMC when separate disabilities independently combine to 60 percent or more. VA cannot deny SMC simply because the veteran lacks a schedular 100% rating if TDIU is based on a single disability.

In Bradley v. Peake, the Court held that a TDIU award based on a single disability can satisfy the “service-connected disability rated as total” requirement for Special Monthly Compensation (SMC) under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s).

The case involved a combat veteran with numerous shell fragment wound injuries, PTSD, multiple muscle group injuries, scars, and a longstanding TDIU award. VA later replaced his TDIU with a 100% combined schedular rating after additional disabilities were rated.

VA denied SMC because the veteran did not have a single schedular 100% disability rating. The Court rejected that interpretation. It held that neither 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) nor 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(i) limited “a service-connected disability rated as total” to only schedular 100% ratings.

The Court further held that VA must determine whether TDIU was based on a single disability because, if so, the veteran could qualify for SMC when additional disabilities independently combined to at least 60 percent.

Importantly, the Court emphasized VA’s obligation to maximize benefits and held that VA improperly substituted a 100% combined rating for TDIU without considering whether preserving TDIU based on a single disability would create entitlement to additional SMC compensation.

Bradley became one of the foundational modern cases governing VA’s duty to maximize benefits and the relationship between TDIU and SMC.

The Court held that service connection for additional physical diagnoses was not warranted where the Board found the symptoms were part of a single psychiatric disability, because rating both would constitute prohibited pyramiding. The Court also found any possible evidentiary error nonprejudicial and declined to reach unripe duty-to-assist arguments.

The veteran, a former Merchant Marine seaman, sought service connection for headaches with dizziness and a gastrointestinal disorder after the Board granted service connection for a psychiatric disorder diagnosed as somatoform in nature. The Board concluded that the headaches, dizziness, and diarrhea were somatic manifestations of the psychiatric condition rather than separate organic disabilities. On appeal, the Court held that awarding service connection for the physical symptom claims in addition to the psychiatric disability would amount to impermissible pyramiding under 38 C.F.R. § 4.14 and the psychophysiological rating rule then found in 38 C.F.R. § 4.132. The Court also noted that, even if the Board had improperly discounted one physician’s opinion, any such error was not prejudicial because the record contained another medical basis supporting the Board’s conclusion. The Court affirmed and declined to consider unripe duty-to-assist arguments because no rating decision had yet been issued.

The Federal Circuit held that the note to Diagnostic Code 7343 is prospective only and does not require VA to preserve a 100% cancer rating until a later VA examination when the rating is assigned retroactively. The veteran therefore was not entitled to an additional retroactive total rating for periods when his tongue cancer was inactive and rated on residuals.

Willis Breland, a Vietnam veteran exposed to Agent Orange, was diagnosed with tongue cancer in 2006 and treated through early 2007. VA initially denied service connection, but later granted service connection retroactively after receiving a favorable medical opinion. In doing so, VA assigned staged 100% ratings for the periods of active malignancy and treatment, plus six months after treatment, and then rated the disability on residuals when the record showed no recurrence or metastasis.

Breland challenged the reduction to noncompensable or residual ratings, arguing that the note to 38 C.F.R. § 4.114, Diagnostic Code 7343 required a mandatory VA examination six months after discontinuance of treatment before VA could assign anything less than 100%. The Board and Veterans Court rejected that theory, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. The court held that the note’s text, read with 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(e), is prospective: it governs continuation and reduction of an existing total rating, not a rating assigned retroactively after the relevant period has passed. Because VA could not perform the contemplated six-month examination in hindsight, and because the veteran’s records showed no active cancer during the disputed periods, VA properly rated the condition on residuals.

The decision is important because it prevents veterans from using retroactive service-connection awards to convert long-past inactive disease periods into continuing total ratings. It also clarifies that the diagnostic-code note is tied to real-time rating reductions and notice procedures, not to later retrospective adjudication based on records already in the file.

The Court reversed the Board’s denial of a compensable tinnitus rating because the Board lacked a plausible evidentiary basis for finding the tinnitus was due to disease rather than acoustic trauma and improperly relied on its own medical judgment.

The veteran sought a compensable rating for service-connected tinnitus. The Board denied the claim by concluding that the tinnitus was related to disease, specifically otitis externa, rather than acoustic trauma, and therefore did not satisfy the rating schedule’s criteria for a compensable evaluation. On appeal, the Court reviewed the evidentiary basis for that factual finding and the Board’s reasons or bases.

The Court held that there was no plausible basis in the record for the Board’s conclusion. The contemporaneous service records did not show that otitis externa caused tinnitus, and the Board’s statement that otitis externa is a disease that causes tinnitus was an unsupported medical inference. By contrast, the record included sworn testimony of in-service noise exposure and a VA audiological opinion indicating that the tinnitus was consistent with a history of noise exposure. Because the Board’s contrary finding lacked evidentiary support, the Court set it aside as clearly erroneous.

The Court reversed rather than remanding because no plausible basis existed for the Board to reach the same conclusion on remand. The Court did not decide the veteran’s constitutional challenge to the tinnitus rating regulation, resolving the appeal on the nonconstitutional ground that the Board’s factual finding could not stand. The practical effect was reversal and remand for assignment of a compensable rating under the tinnitus diagnostic code.

The Court held that the Board improperly treated the absence of medical evidence as substantive negative evidence without establishing that the condition or symptom would ordinarily have been recorded. Buczynski is an important evidentiary case limiting VA’s ability to rely on silence in medical records as proof against a veteran’s claim.

In Buczynski v. Shinseki, the Court reviewed a Board decision denying a higher disability rating for a skin condition. The veteran argued that the Board improperly relied on the absence of evidence in medical records to conclude that his skin disorder was not “exceptionally repugnant” under the applicable diagnostic criteria.

The Court agreed that the Board’s analysis was flawed. The Board had inferred that because treatment records did not describe the veteran’s condition as exceptionally repugnant, the condition therefore lacked that level of severity. The Court explained that silence in medical records cannot automatically be treated as substantive negative evidence unless there is a proper evidentiary foundation establishing that the fact in question ordinarily would have been recorded.

The Court emphasized that there was no medical reason to expect physicians to routinely comment on whether a skin condition was “exceptionally repugnant” for VA rating purposes. Because the Board failed to establish why the absence of such commentary was meaningful, it improperly relied on silence in the records as evidence against the claim.

The decision clarified an important evidentiary principle in veterans law: absence of evidence is not necessarily negative evidence. The Court distinguished situations where a missing notation may have probative value from situations where the medical record would not ordinarily contain the disputed information.

The Court ultimately remanded the matter for readjudication with proper evidentiary analysis.

The Court reversed the Board because medical evidence showed the veteran’s coronary artery disease precluded more than sedentary employment, satisfying the 100% criteria under DC 7005. The case matters because it confirms that the Board cannot reject uncontroverted evidence meeting the schedular standard.

The veteran appealed a Board decision denying an increased rating for service-connected coronary artery disease and a total rating based on individual unemployability. He later withdrew the TDIU issue, leaving only the increased-rating question. The record contained medical evidence from both a VA physician and a private cardiologist stating that his coronary artery disease rendered him unemployable or precluded meaningful employment. The Board nevertheless denied a 100% rating under Diagnostic Code 7005, finding that the chronic residuals required for that rating were not shown.

The Court held that the Board’s factual finding was clearly erroneous because the evidence satisfied the 100% schedular criterion in DC 7005 requiring that more than sedentary employment be precluded. The Court emphasized that there was no plausible basis in the record for the Board’s contrary conclusion. It reversed the Board and remanded for assignment of a 100% rating. Although the Secretary conceded reasons-or-bases deficiencies, the Court resolved the appeal on the merits and did not rest its holding on those procedural concessions.