The Court held that obesity may be a disability for secondary service connection if it causes functional impairment of earning capacity, but it upheld the view that obesity is not a disease for direct service connection under section 1110. The Board’s denial was vacated because it failed to discuss favorable evidence of functional impairment.

The appellant sought service connection for obesity, including as secondary to service-connected PTSD. The Board denied the claim relying on VA General Counsel Precedent Opinion 1-2017 and on the view that obesity is not a disease or disability for VA compensation purposes. On appeal, the Court first held that it had jurisdiction to review whether obesity may be a disability for purposes of 38 U.S.C. § 1110, citing Larson v. McDonough and Saunders v. Wilkie. The Court concluded that the General Counsel’s blanket view that obesity is not a disability was not persuasive because Saunders defines disability as functional impairment of earning capacity, and nothing in Saunders supports excluding a condition merely because not every person with that condition is impaired. At the same time, the Court held that the General Counsel’s view that obesity is not a disease for purposes of direct service connection remained persuasive, so the Court did not disturb the Board’s direct-service-connection analysis. For secondary service connection, however, the Court held that the disease/injury requirement is not controlling in the same way and that the General Counsel’s regulation-based rationale was inconsistent with the governing statute and Spicer. The Court ultimately vacated and remanded the secondary-service-connection portion of the Board decision because the Board failed to discuss favorable evidence suggesting functional impairment, including a treatment record linking weakness and postural changes to obesity.

The Court held that VA’s 1946 denial of service connection was clearly and unmistakably erroneous because it failed to apply the controlling presumptions of soundness and aggravation, and no specific finding rebutting aggravation was made. The case shows that ignoring a dispositive presumption is legal error that can warrant revision of the original decision.

The veteran sought service connection for enucleation of his right eye and argued that a 1946 rating decision denying the claim contained clear and unmistakable error. The Court reviewed the original record and the then-controlling Veterans Regulation 1(a), which provided the presumption of soundness and a presumption of aggravation when a preexisting condition increased in severity during service unless there was a specific finding that the increase was due to natural progression. The Court emphasized the distinction between “clear and unmistakable evidence,” which is the burden used to rebut presumptions, and “clear and unmistakable error,” which is the standard for revising a final decision.

The Court concluded that the 1946 decision relied only on basic entitlement language and failed to address the regulatory presumptions that were central to the claim. Because the record lacked the specific finding needed to rebut aggravation, and because failure to observe a regulation favorable to the claimant is itself error, the Court held that the original denial was CUE. It reversed the Board and remanded with instructions to amend the 1946 decision to grant service connection and assign the proper rating effective as of the original decision date.

The Court held that VA improperly required the veteran to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence rather than applying the benefit-of-the-doubt standard under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). The Court also held that the Board impermissibly substituted its own medical judgment when it rejected a favorable medical opinion as “rank speculation” without independent medical evidence contradicting the opinion.

The veteran sought service connection for a seizure disorder, arguing that headaches and blackout symptoms documented during Vietnam service represented the onset of the later-diagnosed condition. A private physician testified that the veteran’s in-service symptoms could represent an “epileptic spark in the brain” and that wartime stress may have triggered the disorder.

VA examiners later stated that there was insufficient information to determine a “definite” or “obvious” etiology for the seizure disorder. The Board denied the claim, concluding that the evidence favoring the veteran did not outweigh the evidence against the claim and characterizing the favorable private opinion as “rank speculation.”

The Court vacated the Board decision. First, the Court held that the Board improperly substituted its own medical judgment by dismissing the favorable medical opinion without citing independent medical evidence refuting it. The VA opinions merely stated that the exact etiology was unclear; they did not exclude the possibility that the disorder began during service as the private physician suggested.

Second, the Court held that the Board applied the wrong evidentiary standard. The Board effectively required the veteran to prove that favorable evidence outweighed negative evidence, contrary to the benefit-of-the-doubt framework established in Gilbert v. Derwinski. The Court reiterated that a claim should be granted when the evidence is in approximate balance and that the veteran need not prove the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Alemany became an important case reinforcing the proper evidentiary burden in VA claims adjudication and limiting the Board’s ability to reject favorable medical opinions without competent contradictory evidence.

When a service-connected condition aggravates a non-service-connected condition, the veteran is entitled to compensation for the degree of additional disability resulting from the aggravation. A service-connected condition does not need to directly cause another disability for compensation to be awarded. If the service-connected condition aggravates or worsens another condition, the veteran may be compensated for the additional level of impairment resulting from that aggravation.

In Allen v. Brown, the Court fundamentally expanded the scope of secondary service connection in veterans law by holding that veterans may be compensated not only for disabilities directly caused by a service-connected condition, but also for any additional impairment resulting from aggravation of a non-service-connected condition by a service-connected disability.

The veteran was service connected for traumatic arthritis of the right knee and later developed arthritis in the left knee and both hips. Multiple medical opinions addressed whether the service-connected right knee condition altered the veteran’s gait and aggravated the non-service-connected joint conditions. One VA examiner specifically concluded that the left knee and hip conditions were “definitely aggravated” by the service-connected right knee arthritis.

Despite this evidence, the Board denied secondary service connection because it focused narrowly on whether the service-connected right knee condition directly caused the onset of the additional joint disabilities. The Court rejected that restrictive interpretation and held that VA compensation law focuses on impairment of earning capacity and functional disability, not merely the original medical cause of a disease process.

The Court determined that when a service-connected condition aggravates another condition, the veteran is entitled to compensation for the additional degree of disability resulting from that aggravation. The Court explained that compensation is warranted for the incremental increase in impairment caused by the service-connected condition, even if the underlying non-service-connected condition originated independently.

Allen became one of the foundational secondary service connection precedents in veterans law and remains central to aggravation analysis under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310.

The Federal Circuit held that an asymptomatic preexisting condition may still be “noted” at service entry under 38 U.S.C. § 1111, so the presumption of soundness does not apply. It also dismissed the veteran’s factual challenge that the condition had been resolved, because that argument sought review of findings outside the court’s jurisdiction.

Edward Amezquita appealed a Veterans Court decision affirming the Board’s denial of service connection for a left shoulder disability. He had undergone a Bankart repair before service, and his entrance examination listed that surgery in the defects section while also stating he was asymptomatic and had no physical limitations. The Board treated the condition as noted at entry, applied the aggravation framework under 38 U.S.C. § 1153, and found no in-service aggravation. The Veterans Court affirmed, relying on Verdon v. Brown to conclude that an asymptomatic condition may still be noted as a preexisting defect under § 1111.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the Veterans Court’s interpretation of § 1111. It explained that the statute does not limit defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at entry to conditions that were symptomatic at the time of the examination. The court held that an asymptomatic condition can be noted as preexisting under the presumption-of-soundness statute. The court then dismissed Amezquita’s argument that his condition had been resolved on entry because that challenge attacked factual findings beyond Federal Circuit jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

The Federal Circuit held that 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d) requires a severance certification to be based on all accumulated evidence, and vacated where VA relied on a medical opinion that did not consider the full record used to grant service connection.

Andino served on active duty from 1969 to 1970 and was granted service connection for schizophrenia shortly after separation based on multiple post-service diagnoses and symptoms suggesting an underlying schizophrenic process. VA later severed service connection after a physician wrote that the earlier schizophrenia diagnosis had been in error. The Board and Veterans Court upheld the severance, but the Federal Circuit vacated that decision.

The court interpreted 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d) to require that a change-in-diagnosis severance be supported by a medical certification made in light of all accumulated evidence. The court concluded that VA could not sever service connection on the basis of a medical opinion that reviewed only some of the evidence considered when the original award was made. The court emphasized that it was not reweighing evidence or making credibility determinations, but held that the Board and Veterans Court misread the regulation’s legal requirements. The case matters because it constrains severance practice and requires VA to ensure that any medical basis for severance addresses the full evidentiary record underpinning the original grant.

The Court affirmed the Board’s refusal to reopen an acquired psychiatric-disorder claim, holding that the post-denial evidence was cumulative or not material. It also held that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply until the claimant clears the threshold reopening burden, and that an unadjudicated CUE theory first raised on appeal was not within the Court’s jurisdiction.

The appellant sought service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder after prior final denials had found that his schizophrenia preexisted service and was not aggravated by service. After the Board again declined to reopen the claim, the Secretary moved to vacate and remand in light of Manio and Colvin, arguing that the Board had not articulated the two-step reopening analysis or discussed benefit of the doubt and alleged bias. The Court denied the motion and affirmed.

The Court held that reopening under 38 U.S.C. § 5108 requires new and material evidence and that the reopening determination is reviewed de novo. Applying that standard, the Court concluded that the wife’s statements were cumulative of evidence already considered and, in any event, lay opinion could not competently establish the medical question of aggravation. The November 1989 VA psychiatric report was new but not material because it did not support in-service aggravation and, if anything, suggested the service period was not especially stressful. Because the claimant had not met the threshold reopening burden, the Court held that the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine did not apply.

The Court also addressed the claimant’s bias argument, acknowledging that the rating specialist’s language in the statement of the case was inappropriate and inconsistent with VA’s ex parte adjudicatory obligations, but finding no evidence that it influenced the decision and thus no prejudicial error. Finally, the Court held that a CUE claim raised for the first time before the Court was not properly before it because there had been no final Board adjudication of that theory.

The Federal Circuit held that 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) is the controlling regulation for PTSD claims and requires credible supporting evidence of the in-service stressor; § 3.303 does not create an alternative path to service connection.

Michael Arzio sought service connection for PTSD after previously being denied by VA. The record showed psychiatric-type symptoms during service, but the Board found that he had not provided credible supporting evidence that an in-service stressor actually occurred. Arzio argued that he could establish service connection under the general principles of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 without meeting the PTSD-specific requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f).

The Federal Circuit rejected that argument. The court explained that § 3.304(f) is the specific regulation governing PTSD claims and expressly requires medical evidence diagnosing PTSD, a medical nexus to an in-service stressor, and credible supporting evidence that the stressor occurred. The court held that § 3.303 states only general service-connection principles and does not provide an alternative method for avoiding § 3.304(f)’s specific evidentiary requirements. Applying the canon that the specific governs the general, the court affirmed the denial of benefits. The decision is important because it reinforces that PTSD claims must be proven under the PTSD-specific regulation, and general service-connection language cannot substitute for stressor corroboration.

The Court vacated and remanded because the Board failed to give adequate reasons or bases, did not properly address favorable lay and service evidence, and impermissibly relied on its own medical judgment in rejecting a PTSD-based cause-of-death theory.

The widow of a Vietnam veteran sought burial benefits and DIC, arguing that the veteran’s death from a gunshot wound was service connected because he suffered from PTSD and alcohol dependence related to his combat experiences. The record included service records suggesting stressful Vietnam experiences, lay statements describing behavioral change after service, and a private psychologist’s opinion linking the veteran’s symptoms and alcohol dependence to PTSD. The Board denied the claim, reasoning that the record did not clinically demonstrate PTSD and that the symptoms were consistent with alcohol dependence.

The Court vacated the Board decision and remanded. It held that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons or bases under 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) because it did not meaningfully address favorable stressor evidence, lay testimony, and supporting statements from family and friends. The Court also held that the Board erred by effectively making its own medical judgment about whether the veteran’s alcohol dependence could be related to PTSD, contrary to Colvin. In addition, the Court found the claimant had submitted competent evidence sufficient to make the claim plausible, and it emphasized the need to consider the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine and, if necessary, seek an advisory medical opinion. The case matters because it reinforces that the Board must confront favorable evidence directly and cannot deny a medically complex theory without independent medical support.

The Court affirmed one rating determination but vacated and remanded others because the Board failed to provide adequate reasons or bases for rejecting lay testimony supporting sinusitis and concussion ratings, and failed to address a reasonably raised service-connection claim for a psychological disorder.

Jimmy F. Ashmore sought increased ratings for service-connected facial asymmetry, maxillary sinusitis, and residuals of a cerebral concussion, and also asserted that he had a psychiatric disorder secondary to his in-service head injury. The Court affirmed the Board’s denial of an increased rating for facial disfigurement because the Board relied on medical findings describing the deformity as mild, and that factual determination was not clearly erroneous.

The Court vacated and remanded the denials involving maxillary sinusitis and cerebral concussion because the Board failed to make explicit credibility findings regarding Ashmore’s sworn testimony describing headaches, drainage, dizziness, and insomnia. The Court explained that when such testimony could support entitlement under the applicable diagnostic codes, the Board must address credibility and provide adequate reasons or bases for rejecting it. The Court also held that the Board erred by failing to address Ashmore’s expressly raised claim for service connection for a psychological disorder, which the record reasonably presented and which the Board overlooked altogether. The decision underscores both the Board’s reasons-or-bases obligations and its duty to address issues plainly raised by the claimant and the record.

The Federal Circuit held that the absence of a service record documenting an unreported sexual assault is not pertinent evidence that the assault did not occur. The decision recognized the well-established reality that many victims of military sexual trauma (MST) do not officially report assaults during service.

The veteran sought service connection for PTSD based on military sexual trauma. VA denied the claim in part because service records did not document reports of the alleged assault.

The Federal Circuit rejected VA’s reliance on the absence of official reporting as negative evidence. The court explained that sexual assaults are frequently unreported and that silence in service records therefore lacks meaningful probative value regarding whether the assault actually occurred.

The court reviewed military and scientific studies documenting widespread underreporting of sexual assault and concluded that the Board errs when it treats the lack of official documentation as substantive evidence against the occurrence of MST.

AZ significantly strengthened evidentiary protections for MST claimants and reinforced the need for careful evaluation of lay evidence, behavioral changes, and alternative corroborating evidence in personal-assault PTSD claims.

The Court held that the presumption of soundness attached because the ulcer was not noted on induction, but the Board properly rebutted that presumption with clear and unmistakable evidence that the ulcer existed before service.

Bagby sought service connection for a duodenal ulcer after an initial denial and later attempts to reopen his claim. The Board reached the merits without expressly deciding whether new and material evidence had been submitted, and the Court reviewed the case on the entire record. The principal question addressed was whether the veteran’s ulcer was incurred in service or whether the presumption of soundness was rebutted.

The Court explained that the presumption of soundness applies when an induction examination does not note the claimed condition, but that the presumption may be overcome by clear and unmistakable evidence of preexistence. The Court also addressed the standard of review, holding that whether the established facts satisfy the statutory clear-and-unmistakable-evidence standard is a legal determination subject to de novo review. Applying that standard, the Court relied on service hospital records describing the ulcer as chronic and old, along with a pre-service physician statement documenting treatment for peptic ulcer symptoms before service. On that basis, the Court concluded that the presumption was rebutted and affirmed the Board.

The case is important because it confirms both the evidentiary threshold for rebutting the presumption of soundness and the appellate court’s willingness to independently review whether the legal standard was met, rather than deferring entirely to the Board’s conclusion.

The Court held that new and material evidence reopened the veteran’s claim for post-traumatic osteoarthritis and reversed the Board’s denial of the right shoulder claim as arbitrary and capricious. It also vacated and remanded the remaining joint claims because the Board failed to consider the entire record and gave only conclusory reasons for rejecting favorable medical evidence.

The veteran, a World War II former prisoner of war, sought service connection for post-traumatic osteoarthritis affecting multiple joints. The Board had previously denied the claim, but later evidence included favorable private and VA medical opinions suggesting traumatic causation, particularly for the knees and right shoulder. The Court held that the evidence submitted in 1988 was new and material and therefore reopened the claim under 38 U.S.C. § 5108. The Court also explained that the Board was required to evaluate the new evidence together with the entire record, not in isolation, when readjudicating the reopened claim.

On the right shoulder, the Court reversed the Board’s denial. It found the Board’s conclusion that the right shoulder arthritis was degenerative rather than traumatic was arbitrary and capricious because the Board treated very similar evidence differently from the evidence supporting the wrist award, without a rational explanation. The Court also emphasized that the record contained early complaints of right shoulder pain and medical opinions suggesting prior trauma. For the knees, hips, spine, left ankle, and left shoulder, the Court vacated and remanded because the Board provided only a conclusory statement, failed to explain why favorable medical evidence was unpersuasive, and did not adequately state reasons or bases under 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1).

The Court affirmed the Board’s refusal to reopen a claim for service connection for the cause of death because the proffered evidence was cumulative and immaterial to the dispositive issue. Lay speculation about medical causation was not competent evidence.

Linda L. Barfield sought to reopen a previously denied claim for service connection for the cause of her veteran husband’s death, which had been attributed to sepsis resulting from peritonitis as a consequence of liver disease. The Board had earlier denied the claim and later found that the evidence submitted in support of reopening did not qualify as new and material. On review, the Court affirmed.

The Court explained that under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108, a disallowed claim must be reopened only when new and material evidence is presented. Applying Colvin, the Court stated that material evidence must be relevant and probative of the issue at hand and that new evidence cannot be merely cumulative. Barfield’s submitted 1981 examination record confirmed alcoholism in service, but that fact had already been before the Board and the report did not address liver disease or the cause of death. The Court therefore held that the evidence was not material.

The Court also rejected Barfield’s personal belief that alcoholism caused her husband’s death, noting that as a lay witness she was not competent to render a medical causation opinion. The Court affirmed the Board’s refusal to reopen without reaching any broader question about whether chronic alcoholism itself could be service connected.

The Court held that once VA undertakes to provide a medical examination or opinion, it must ensure that the examination is adequate. The Court also held that lay testimony may be competent to establish the presence of observable symptomatology, including continuity of symptoms for conditions capable of lay observation such as varicose veins.

The veteran sought service connection for varicose veins, asserting that the condition began during service and had continued since that time. The Board denied the claim after relying on a VA medical examination that concluded the disability was unrelated to service.

The Court found the VA examination inadequate because the examiner failed to meaningfully address whether the veteran’s current varicose veins were related to the observable symptoms described during and after service. The Court emphasized that once VA elects to provide a medical examination, the duty to assist requires that the examination be adequate for adjudication purposes.

The Court also discussed the competency of lay evidence. It explained that varicose veins are a condition capable of lay observation because they are visually observable and identifiable without specialized medical training. Therefore, the veteran’s testimony concerning continuity of symptoms was competent evidence that required proper consideration.

Barr became one of the foundational veterans-law cases governing adequacy of VA examinations and the competency of lay evidence concerning observable conditions.

The Federal Circuit affirmed because most of the claimant’s arguments attacked factual weighing beyond its jurisdiction, and under Rizzo VA was not required to affirmatively prove expert qualifications absent a specific competence challenge. The decision also upheld the Veterans Court’s enforcement of its rule against citing nonprecedential opinions.

Mr. Bastien served from 1972 to 1976 and worked in a radiation facility where he handled monkeys used in radiation experiments. After his death from pneumonia resulting from Waldenström’s macroglobulinemia, his widow sought DIC and related benefits based on alleged in-service ionizing radiation exposure. The Board found the evidence conflicted on both radiation dose and medical nexus, and it assigned greater probative value to VA physicians’ opinions concluding that the cancer was unlikely to be caused by service radiation exposure. The Veterans Court affirmed, and the Federal Circuit in turn held that most of the widow’s arguments merely disputed factual findings and the Board’s weighing of evidence, which the court lacked jurisdiction to review under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). The court further held that Rizzo controlled the expert-qualification issue: unless the claimant specifically challenges a VA expert’s competence or qualifications, VA is not required to present affirmative proof of the physician’s expertise before the Board may rely on the opinion. Finally, the court upheld the Veterans Court’s decision to strike an opening brief that cited nonprecedential opinions in violation of its rules. The case matters primarily for jurisdiction and evidentiary strategy in Federal Circuit appeals, and for preserving a concrete, specific challenge if a claimant intends to contest a VA medical expert’s competency.

The Court held that a 1986 rating decision, by increasing the veteran’s evaluation based on the symptoms of ischemic heart disease, legally granted service connection for that disease. Because VA later denied related cardiovascular, vascular, and amputation claims without complying with 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d), the Board’s decision was reversed and remanded.

The veteran, Thomas P. Baughman, had long-standing service-connected rheumatic heart disease. In 1986, VA increased his rating after noting that he had ischemic heart disease and that the symptoms related to that ischemic disease would be considered in evaluating the service-connected rheumatic heart disease. After the veteran later developed arteriosclerotic cardiovascular and peripheral vascular disease and underwent an above-the-knee amputation, VA denied service connection for those conditions, and the Board affirmed.

The Court focused on the legal effect of the 1986 rating decision. It held that the rating action, as a matter of law, granted service connection for ischemic heart disease because VA expressly relied on the symptoms of that disease when assigning the increased rating. The Court further held that the Board’s later denial necessarily amounted to an attempted severance of that grant, but VA had not complied with the procedural safeguards or burden of proof required by 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d). Because service connection had already been established and had not been properly severed, the Board erred in denying the downstream cardiovascular, vascular, and amputation claims. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Court held that personality disorders are developmental defects not subject to service connection and affirmed the Board’s denial of a higher anxiety rating because the Board’s finding of only mild impairment was plausible under the evidence.

The appellant sought service connection for a personality disorder and an increased rating for service-connected anxiety reaction. The Board denied both, finding that a personality disorder is a developmental defect rather than an acquired psychiatric disease and that the anxiety reaction produced no more than mild social and industrial impairment. The Court affirmed.

On the service-connection issue, the Court agreed that personality disorders are not disabilities for VA compensation purposes under the governing regulations. On the rating issue, the Court reviewed the Board’s factual determination under the clearly erroneous standard and concluded that the record plausibly supported the finding that the service-connected anxiety reaction was only mildly disabling. The Court also noted that any unemployability theory based on the service-connected condition would not be supported on this record and that a pension theory was not before the Board. The decision is a straightforward application of the noncompensability of personality disorders and appellate deference to supported Board factfinding.

The Court held that the Board’s finding that multiple sclerosis was not incurred during active duty for training was not clearly erroneous, and that the seven-year presumption for multiple sclerosis was unavailable because the appellant’s training service did not constitute active military service under the statute.

The appellant served only on active duty for training in the National Guard and later sought service connection for multiple sclerosis. The Board found that multiple sclerosis was not incurred during either training period and that the disease first appeared in the record after service. The Court reviewed that factual finding under the clearly erroneous standard and held that the record provided a plausible basis for the Board’s conclusion. Because the appellant offered lay testimony and statements describing symptoms, but no medical evidence showing multiple sclerosis during training or symptoms not otherwise explained, the Court affirmed the Board’s factual determination.

The Court also addressed the appellant’s alternative argument that she could invoke the seven-year presumption for multiple sclerosis. The Court interpreted 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(24), 101(2), 312, and 337 to mean that presumptive service connection under those statutes applies only to a veteran whose service qualifies as active military, naval, or air service. For a period of active duty for training to count, the claimant must have been disabled from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in line of duty during that period. Because the appellant had no other qualifying disability during training, her active duty for training did not satisfy the statutory definition of active service, and the presumption was unavailable as a matter of law. The decision thus clarifies the distinct statutory role of veteran status, qualifying service, and presumptive service connection.

The Court held that the AMA does not categorically violate due process when one Board member conducts a hearing and another decides the appeal, but it also held that Bryant hearing duties still apply in AMA hearings. The Court remanded Pinto for a Bryant violation and Bilharz for inadequate reasons or bases.

In these consolidated appeals, the Court addressed two recurring AMA issues and set aside both Board decisions. First, the appellants argued that fair process and due process categorically require the same Board member who conducts a hearing to also decide the appeal. The Court rejected that categorical argument, holding that neither the Due Process Clause nor fair process requires the same Board member in every case. The Court reasoned that due process is flexible, that Board decisions are made on de novo review of the record, and that the administrative burden of a same-member rule would be substantial. The Court left open only the possibility of an as-applied due process violation on a case-specific record, but found none here.

Second, the Court held that the hearing duties recognized in Bryant continue to apply in AMA Board hearings, even though the regulatory anchor changed from 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) to § 20.705. The Court relied on the nonexclusive language of § 20.705 and VA’s rulemaking commentary stating that the AMA amendments were not intended to limit Bryant. Applying that rule, the Court found that the Board member who conducted Mr. Pinto’s hearing did not fulfill the duty to explain the issues or suggest the submission of potentially advantageous evidence, so Pinto’s PTSD and TDIU appeal was remanded.

Finally, the Court agreed with Mr. Bilharz that the Board’s reasons or bases were inadequate because it dismissed his lay testimony with conclusory statements about competency without clearly addressing credibility or explaining the treatment of favorable evidence. The Court therefore remanded Bilharz’s service-connection claims as well.